Acid test for the european far right

Written by Sunna Kokkonen, March 2019

In addition to the upcoming European Parliament election in May, a handful of EU countries are hosting parliamentary elections in 2019. The Stand provides a glance at the election setting in two EU member states and the Union as a whole.

Finland

The Nordic republic is known as one of the most functional welfare states in the world and is home to 5.5 million inhabitants, and, rather surprisingly, a backwards-aspiring conservative government. The current government is comprised of three equally large parties: the National Coalition party (fiscal conservative), the Centre Party (traditionally agrarian) and the Finns (right-leaning populists). Contrary to media predictions, the current government has not fallen during its four turbulent years in power.

What makes the April parliamentary election particularly interesting is the fact that the Finns, as opposed to their numerous European sibling parties, have been trusted with government responsibility during the current electoral cycle. This took a heavy toll on the party, which split into two due to internal disputes in 2016, and both halves have sunken in the polls since.

Political theorists have suggested that the surest way to burst the populist bubble is to hand them the reigns of power. This theory would imply that days of glory are over for the Finns. As the popularity of the far right continues to decline, the Social Democrats and the Greens are skyrocketing in the polls, propelling climate change and education back into the political agenda. Whether they can keep their success until the election, remains to be seen. All in all, the results of the Finnish election may serve as an indicator for the future of the countries currently governed by populist forces, such as Brazil or the US.

Poland

Poland, one of the largest EU member states, is holding elections on both levels of its parliament in late autumn 2019.

Since its rise to power in 2015, the Law and Justice party dominated Polish politics, gaining an impressive 38% of the popular vote. The key to their success was the use of nationalist rhetorics, such as promoting catholic values and posing refugees and immigrants as a threat to the national security. The second largest party, the center-conservative Civic Platform, scored a quarter of the votes in 2015 and still appears as number two in the polls.

However, the Poles are getting tired of being stuck in the right-wing conservative discourse. The position of the catholic state church is being questioned more than ever, especially after the recently released controversial film ”Clergy”, depicting the corruption rooted deeply in its structure.

For years, hopelessness has riddled the liberal and left-leaning Polish voters. In recent weeks however, apathy has turned into budding hope as a new party emerged in February 2019. The newcomer, named Spring, is attacking the dominant conservative narrative, and appealing to younger generations with their feminist, LGBTQ+ friendly and green views. According to the latest polls, the support for the infant party has exceeded 10%. Nevertheless, it’s a long run to the elections, and what begins in the spring might well wither away with the autumn leaves.

Who to watch for?

Ozan Yanar: The 31-year-old economist is a first-term Greens MP from Helsinki. He has been subject to hate speech due to his Turkish background – will he be discouraged by discrimination or rise in ranks to a minister position in case of a Green landslide victory?

Robert Biedroń: Formerly the first openly gay mayor in Poland, Biedroń abandoned his previous party in order to launch Spring. His charisma appeals to young, liberal voters, but will the charm last until the election?

What about Fidesz?

Currently, Fidesz forms a part of the largest party of the European Parliament: the center-conservative EPP. Orbán’s authoritarian law-making has been alarming to his party-mates for years, but a tipping point is yet to be reached. Assistant Professor Thomas Fetzer from the CEU Department of International Relations finds showing Fidesz the door both problematic and promising.

On the one hand, EPP would take a visible stand for the values of the European Union, such as democracy and the rule of law - but simultaneously shrink the size and the power of the party by cutting all the Fidesz MEPs out. On the other hand, Orbán could begin fulfilling his lifelong dream of extending his power outside of Hungary by mediating the disagreement between the fragmented nationalist parties in the European parliament.

European parliament: inevitable populist triumph?

The European parliament elections will be held between May 23rd and 26th 2019. The approaching redistribution of power in the second largest democratically elected parliament in the world has been largely invisible in European media, since all eyes have been pinned to Brexit for the past two years.

Interestingly, the two events are interlinked: if Brexit falls through before May, the 73 seats that used to belong to the UK will be redistributed among the remaining member states. In addition, the total number of seats will also shrink anyway due to a decision to decrease the overall number from 751 to 701. As a result, the relative power of large member states like Germany, Italy, and Poland would grow, and it would be more difficult for small parties from any member state to enter the parliament as the election threshold goes up as a result of the decreased number of seats.

Associate Professor Thomas Fetzer from the CEU Department of International Relations does not regard the May election as a life and death determining moment for European democracy.

”European far-right remains fragmented and has not succeeded at creating a Union-wide campaign”, Fetzer says. He also states that it is already too late to start building one.

At the moment, nationalist parties are divided into multiple groups in the European parliament. Few, such as the Hungarian Fidesz, reside in the conservative EPP block. Instead of a united nationalist block in the parliament, the right-leaning populist parties form three different parliamentary groups.

The German Alternative for Germany and the Italian Five Star Movement belong to the eurosceptic EFD. The French National Rally represents European Alliance for freedom, and several Eastern and Northern European populist parties, including the Polish Law and Justice, have gathered around the flag of the conservative/reformist ECR.

Regardless of the seemingly similar agendas focused on themes like anti-EU and anti-immigration, the Western and Eastern European nationalist parties disagree on a crucial issue: Russia.

”Putin is good friends with the Italian prime minister Salvini, for instance. Some Eastern European member states, who still feel threatened by Russia, can not support that.”

Even though populist parties are fragmented on the European level, they might be headed towards national victories in the EP elections. Their domestic support may still be on the rise.

Fetzer provides an example:

”In France, the National Rally is contesting Macron’s harshly criticized liberal government.”

Hence, popularity in the European elections will further galvanize the populist party’s position in the national political system and strengthen them for the future domestic elections. Fetzer highlights the phenomenon where his own roots lie, too: Eastern Germany. In the state of Saxony, a regional election will take place in early September.

He makes a remark on the increasing polarization among voters:

”Many are supporting Alternative for Germany, but equally many lean towards Greens and the Left. In practise, it will be increasingly difficult to form a functioning government, since the center parties are eroding away.”